Home   About ACA Become A Member Subscribe To ACT Employment Internships Contact Us
Search 
Arms Control Today
Subject Resources
Country Resources
Fact Sheets
Treaties
ACA Events
Press Room
Interviews
Projects & Reports
Book Reviews
Arms Control in Print
Links

Contribute to ACA in 2009!

Register for Arms Control Association e-mail updates
Email:

Fact Sheets

Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: The United States

November 2007

This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the United States subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of the United States, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at http://www.armscontrol.org.   

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

 
Signed
Ratified
Biological Weapons Convention
1972
1975
Chemical Weapons Convention
1993
1997
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
-The Senate rejected the accord Oct. 13, 1999.
[1]
1996
- - -

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-Recognized as one of five nuclear-weapon states.

1968
1970

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
-Party to two of the five protocols.[2]

1982
1995
Outer Space Treaty
1967
1967
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
1990
1992
Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
-Stockpiles some 10.4 million antipersonnel landmines.[3]
- - -
- - -

Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 1998, but the United States has yet to bring the protocol into force.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with Russia.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Founder.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: The United States has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.


Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
In the early 1970s, the United States destroyed its entire stockpile of biological weapons, which had been developed between 1943 and 1969. The United States in recent years has steeply increased funding for biodefense programs, which some independent analysts argue could also lend themselves to offensive weapons research and development.[4]

In 2001, the United States opposed and killed an effort dating back to 1995 to augment the Biological Weapons Convention with a legally binding verification protocol. U.S. officials said the protocol would be too burdensome on legitimate government and private biodefense programs, while not deterring cheaters.

Chemical Weapons:
Behind Russia, the United States declared the second-largest stockpile of chemical agents. As of August 2007, the United States had destroyed about 14,500 metric tons of the initial 27,274 metric tons that it had declared. The U.S. Department of Defense says that it will not complete elimination of the remaining agents until 2023, exceeding the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline by 11 years.  

Missiles:

  • Ballistic Missiles: In September 2005, the United States retired the last of its 50 10-warhead MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), leaving the United States with a land-based ICBM force of 500 Minuteman IIIs. The George W. Bush administration is currently pursuing a plan to trim that remaining force by 50 ICBMs.

    The other long-range missile system maintained by the United States is the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The U.S. Navy is nearing completion of its replacement of all older Trident I missiles with the newer Trident II D5 missile. Fourteen submarines are outfitted with the Trident SLBM.

    Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States is barred from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty.


  • Cruise Missiles: The United States deploys ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles. The Harpoon missile is an anti-ship system, while the Tomahawk, which can be armed with a nuclear warhead, is a land-attack missile. The United States is currently in the process of retiring its nuclear-armed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles and trimming its fleet of AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, which can be armed with conventional or nuclear payloads, to 528 missiles.

Nuclear Weapons:
The U.S. nuclear stockpile consists of approximately 10,000 strategic and tactical warheads. This stockpile includes warheads deployed and those stored in reserve, but it does not include retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement. In a July 2007 report, the United States claimed that 3,696 strategic warheads were “operationally deployed,” meaning warheads loaded onto ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, as well as some warheads stored at heavy bomber bases. U.S. B-52 and B-2 bombers can deliver nuclear payloads.     

The United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. It has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties in good standing under the NPT unless they attack the United States in league with a state possessing nuclear arms. Top U.S. officials, however, have repeatedly hinted that Washington might respond with nuclear arms to a chemical or biological weapons attack, regardless of whether the attacker has nuclear weapons. In its secret September 2002 National Security Presidential Directive-17, the George W. Bush administration stated explicitly that U.S. retaliation options for any type of weapon of mass destruction attack against the United States includes nuclear weapons. 

The United States conducted 1,030 total tests, more nuclear tests than any other state. The first test occurred July 16, 1945, and the last test took place Sept. 23, 1992.

The United States is the only country to have used nuclear weapons against another country, dropping in August 1945 two bombs (one apiece) against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

The United States has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. The United States halted the production of HEU for weapons in 1964 and ceased plutonium reprocessing for weapons in 1992. Current U.S. fissile stockpiles for weapons total about 47 declared metric tons of plutonium and 250 declared metric tons of HEU.[5] Under an agreement finalized in 2000 with Russia, the United States is committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium, but the project has been delayed.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the world’s preeminent conventional arms seller. A 2007 U.S. Congressional Research Service study reported that over the previous eight years the United States had agreed to $123.5 billion in global arms sales, which is an amount more than double the second highest tally of $54 billion by Russia.[6]  


Proliferation Record

A close relationship exists between the U.S. and British nuclear weapons programs, including U.S. supply of the Trident SLBM to the United Kingdom.

The United States also is the only nuclear-weapon power known to station its nuclear weapons in other countries. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom all host U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements. These estimated 480 weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime, but some could be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war.  

Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

The United States is currently implementing two nuclear reductions treaties with Russia. Although Moscow and Washington concluded several years ago the nuclear cuts required by the 1991 START accord, the two governments continue to rely on that treaty’s extensive verification regime to exchange information, visit, and monitor each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. These activities help the two countries assess implementation of their latest nuclear arms agreement, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which did not include verification measures. Under SORT, the two countries are supposed to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. However, the treaty limit expires that same day, freeing both countries to build up their nuclear forces if they choose to do so. Russia is pressing the United States to negotiate a new arms reduction agreement with lower limits on both warheads and delivery vehicles, but the Bush administration has stated it does not want an additional treaty.

The United States has led NATO in demanding that Russia withdraw its remaining military forces from Georgia and Moldova as a condition for ratification of the 1999 Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which would replace the original treaty’s bloc and regional arms limits with national weapon ceilings. In addition to the CFE Treaty, the United States is party to another European security instrument, the Open Skies Treaty, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all states-parties.

The United States has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin America and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Washington, however, declared that it would reserve the right to retaliate with all options, implying the possibility of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the African zone. The United States has not signed the protocols for the Central Asian, Southeast Asian, or South Pacific zones.

The United States has been a leading proponent of negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament. In 2004, however, the United States dropped its support for seeking an “effectively verifiable” cutoff, claiming that a verification regime would be time consuming to negotiate, costly to implement, and ultimately imperfect, potentially impinging on the national security interests of law-abiding states while not deterring determined cheaters. Meanwhile, the United States has staunchly opposed efforts by China and Russia to launch negotiations on a treaty for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Washington contends that there is no arms race in outer space to prevent. These competing priorities have deadlocked the conference which has not negotiated an agreement since concluding the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States has joined with many other countries to promote new restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle mines, but that effort has been blocked by China, Pakistan, and Russia. The United States announced in June 2007 that it was dropping its opposition to negotiations by CCW states on restricting cluster munitions. But the United States said it has no position on the potential outcome of the negotiations except that an agreement should “protect civilians while taking into account security requirements.” The United States has declined to join a Norwegian-led effort outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” 

The United States also has not endorsed a British-led effort to negotiate a United Nations treaty to establish standards for the international arms trade. Washington contends the effort would be too time consuming and produce standards of the lowest common denominator.

Although the United States has elected not to join the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention, the United States is not known to have used antipersonnel landmines since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2004, the United States announced that it would phase out the use of any type of mine lacking self-destruct or self-deactivation features. Washington also has provided the most funding to global demining.

The United States is participating in the so-called six-party process that is supposed to lead to North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. Washington is also actively working to limit Iran’s nuclear activities, which the United States charges are intended to develop nuclear weapons. The United States has pressed for tougher penalties on Iran.

In July 2005, the United States launched an initiative with India to repeal most U.S. and multilateral civilian nuclear trade restrictions on India. Congress gave its qualified approval to the endeavor in December 2006, but the effort has stalled due to opposition from some Indian lawmakers, who charge the deal will erode India’s ability to make independent foreign policy and impinge on its nuclear weapons program.

The United States led a 2003 invasion of Iraq citing its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. No evidence has been discovered to support these allegations.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.


ENDNOTES

1. The Senate could vote on the treaty again. Since taking office in 2001, the George W. Bush administration has said repeatedly that it does not support the treaty.

2. The United States has not ratified Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons, Protocol IV on Blinding Lasers, and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not approved an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, July 2006, 1,236 pp.

4. Roffey, Roger, Hart, John, and Kuhlau, Frida, “Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, p. 17.

5. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report, 2007, October 2007, 164 pp.

6. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.