Nuclear Nonproliferation

Compliance with safeguards obligations is a fundamental part of a country’s participation in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The issue of compliance was central to the contentious discussions at the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and is likely to play a similar role at the 2010 conference.

Preparations for a planned nuclear security summit in Washington are moving along well, and preliminary discussions on follow-up meetings have already begun, a senior Department of State official said in a Dec. 22 interview.

An analysis by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) disputed Syria’s explanation for the presence of man-made uranium particles at a reactor in Damascus, according to a Nov. 16 agency report. The results of environmental sampling carried out at the reactor in August 2008 “do not support Syria’s earlier explanation for the origin and presence of the particles,” the report said.

The crisis over Iran’s growing nuclear weapons capabilities is rapidly reaching a critical point. Recent developments do not bode well for the prospect of successful negotiations that can end concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, at least in the short term.

These concerns center on two related questions: whether Iran can be prevented from using its nuclear program for weapons purposes, and how much confidence the United States and other countries can have in verification measures to ensure that the Iranians are not using their program for such purposes. Iran still has far to go to establish convincingly the peaceful nature of its nuclear efforts. The international community, chiefly through the diplomatic efforts directed by the “P5+1”—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany—has sought to resolve the issue both through diplomatic engagement and, where necessary, pressure.