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“The Arms Control Association and all of the staff I've worked with over the years … have this ability to speak truth to power in a wide variety of venues.”
– Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
June 2, 2022
December 2022
Edition Date: 
Thursday, December 1, 2022
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Russia Delays Meeting on New START


December 2022
By Shannon Bugos

Russia unilaterally called off a meeting with the United States regarding implementation concerns with the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a day before the two sides planned to convene in Cairo.

Moscow informed Washington on Nov. 28 of its decision to “unilaterally postpone” the meeting of the New START Bilateral Consultative Commission, which handles treaty implementation and verification concerns.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov attributed the decision to technical concerns, such as Russian claims of a U.S. failure to implement the treaty fully, and political reasons, including the war in Ukraine. Arms control is not “immune” to world events, he said on Nov. 29. “This is not a cancellation, but a postponement.”

The U.S. State Department reiterated its commitment to rescheduling the meeting as soon as possible.

One discussion topic would have been the nearly three-year pause in the treaty’s on-site inspections of nuclear weapon-related facilities, a hallmark of the New START verification regime. The two countries paused the inspections in March 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. On August 8, Russia further delayed resuming inspections by blocking treaty visits to its facilities.

New START is the last treaty limiting the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals and provides unparalleled insight into Russian nuclear forces.

Russia called off the meeting with the United States a day before it was scheduled in Cairo.

 

G-20 Majority Condemns Russian Nuclear Threats


December 2022
By Shannon Bugos

A majority of the Group of 20 (G-20) states and close Russian partner China criticized Moscow in November for its threats of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine, reflecting the growing international censure of Russian aggression over the past nine months.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo attends the closing press conference of the Group of 20 summit in Bali in November. A majority of the group condemned the Russian war in Ukraine and said the threat or use of nuclear weapons is “inadmissible.” (Photo by Wang Yiliang/Xinhua via Getty Images)Following its 2022 summit in Indonesia, the G-20 issued a statement on Nov. 16 saying that “most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine and stressed it is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy.”

“The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible,” the statement said. The G-20 includes China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy praised the statement as “weighty,” while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described it as “politicized.”

The G-20 statement followed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s denial on Oct. 27 of issuing any threats to employ nuclear weapons in Russia’s war on Ukraine. “We have never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons,” Putin said, arguing that using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine makes no political or military sense for Russia.

Later that day, U.S. President Joe Biden responded that “[i]f [Putin] has no intention…why is he talking about the ability to use a tactical nuclear weapon?”

For the first time, Chinese President Xi Jinping also criticized, albeit modestly, Putin’s nuclear rhetoric.

The international community must “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons” and “advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used, a nuclear war cannot be waged, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis” in Europe or Asia, Xi said on Nov. 4.

He agreed to a stronger denunciation of Russia in a joint statement released after meeting Biden on Nov. 14, their first in-person meeting since Biden took office.

In that exchange, the two presidents “reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine,” according to a White House readout.

Xi’s recent statements have stood out as particularly notable because, throughout the war, Beijing has consistently stood by and offered support to Moscow.

But China tempered the light criticism of Russia in a Nov. 15 statement following a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Lavrov on the sidelines of the G-20 summit.

“China has noted that Russia recently reiterated its established position that a nuclear war must never be fought,” said the statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and this “represents a rational and responsible attitude of Russia.”

Statements by the G-20 and Russian partner China reflect growing international censure of Russia for its aggression in Ukraine over the past nine months.

Biden’s Nuclear Posture Straddles Obama, Trump Policies


December 2022
B​​y Shannon Bugos

The Biden administration finally released its long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which maintains its predecessor’s focus on China and Russia as the top U.S. adversaries but largely reverts to the Obama era with a narrower declaratory policy and strong support for future arms control efforts.

President Joe Biden’s new nuclear policy asserts that the United States will face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries—China, headed by President Xi Jinping (L), and Russia, headed by President Vladimir Putin. (Photo by Alexandr Demyanchuk/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)“By the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries,” states the Biden administration NPR, referring to China and Russia. “This will create new stresses on stability and new challenges for deterrence, assurance, arms control, and risk reduction.”

Richard Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy, oversaw the administration’s review of U.S. nuclear policy, filling in after the ousting last year of Leonor Tomero. (See ACT, December 2021.)

“One of the most important aspects of this 2022 NPR is that we see it as comprehensive, and we see it as balanced,” Johnson said on Nov. 1. “There is just as much discussion in this document about the importance of nuclear deterrence, about our modernization of our nuclear triad, and also about things like arms control, risk reduction, strategic stability—all things that this administration…[wants] to regain the leadership role in.”

The Pentagon released the NPR and the Missile Defense Review on Oct. 27 as components of the department’s overall National Defense Strategy. The White House publicly released its National Security Strategy, which set the guidelines for the Pentagon’s documents, earlier in the month. (See ACT, November 2022.)

The White House transmitted the classified version of the National Defense Strategy to Congress in March, a month after Russia invaded Ukraine. (See ACT, April 2022.) The invasion, according to media reports, prompted the Pentagon to rewrite at least portions of the document and likely delayed its publication.

It casts China as “the most comprehensive and serious challenge” and Russia “as an acute threat.” To simultaneously deter both countries, the United States must continue modernizing the U.S. nuclear triad and infrastructure and reinforcing U.S. extended deterrence commitments, according to the strategy.

Last year, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the United States will spend $634 billion over the next 10 years to sustain and modernize its nuclear arsenal. (See ACT, June 2021.) The Pentagon’s top priority and most expensive modernization programs include the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the B-21 Raider strategic bomber, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile.

At the same time, the Biden administration has committed equally to “pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places a renewed emphasis on arms control, nonproliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability, head off costly arms races, and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally,” the NPR states.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “underscores that nuclear dangers persist and could grow,” the review states. Russian President Vladimir Putin has “conducted aggression against Ukraine under a nuclear shadow characterized by irresponsible saber-rattling, out of cycle nuclear exercises, and false narratives concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction,” it declares.

Given the size, diversity, and modernization of its nuclear arsenal, Russia remains a focus of U.S. arms control efforts. In February 2021, Putin and U.S. President Joe Biden extended for five years the last remaining U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control treaty, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). (See ACT, March 2021.)

Moving forward, the review says, the Biden administration stands “ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026, although negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith.” The U.S. Department of State paused the bilateral strategic stability dialogue on arms control after Russia invaded Ukraine. Whether the dialogue resumes or the two countries will launch a separate, more formal arms control negotiation forum remains unclear.

Any future Russian-U.S. arms control processes increasingly will need to account for China’s nuclear arsenal, the NPR advises. Beijing has refused thus far to engage on the issue. Even so, the Biden administration remains ready to talk with China in bilateral and multilateral forums on “a full range of strategic issues, with a focus on military de-confliction, crisis communications, information sharing, mutual restraint, risk reduction, emerging technologies, and approaches to nuclear arms control.”

The ongoing P5 process, in which the recognized nuclear-weapon states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) meet to discuss their unique responsibilities under the treaty, also could be a venue for efforts “to deepen engagement on nuclear doctrines, concepts for strategic risk reduction, and nuclear arms control verification,” the review states.

Despite Biden’s 2020 presidential campaign pledge to adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear policy, the NPR emphasized the “fundamental role” of nuclear weapons. (See ACT, April 2022.)

Technicians at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. test load a new nuclear-capable weapons delivery system for the B-2 Spirit bomber. U.S. President Joe Biden’s new nuclear policy supports increased spending in such systems. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Devan Halstead)“The fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners,” the Biden NPR states, mirroring the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR. (See ACT, May 2010.) The policy was a disappointment within the arms control community, where many experts argue that a sole-purpose policy is a stronger declaration that the one and only role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, retaliate against a nuclear strike.

Although the Biden review differs from the Trump administration’s 2018 NPR, which asserted a more expansive declaratory policy and lackluster support for arms control, the Biden NPR allows the Pentagon to keep a new low-yield warhead requested four years ago. The Trump administration wanted the low-yield W76-2 warhead, which the Navy deployed on some of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles in late 2019, to fill a perceived gap in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. (See ACT, March 2020.)

But the Biden administration reversed course on two other nuclear capabilities, and as a result, the 2022 review reflected the cancellation of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile and the retirement of the megaton class B83-1 gravity bomb. The Trump NPR attempted to reintroduce the former to the Navy and to postpone the retirement of the latter. (See ACT, March 2018.)

The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy revolves around the concept of integrated deterrence, which also includes missile defense systems, as they “add resilience and undermine adversary confidence in missile use,” the 2022 Missile Defense Review states.

The Biden administration decided to maintain its predecessor’s approach of pursuing long-range missile defenses against possible limited nuclear ballistic missile attacks from North Korea or Iran and to rely on nuclear deterrence to defend against the larger, more sophisticated Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals.

The Missile Defense Review made clear the Biden administration’s intention to move forward with developing the Next Generation Interceptor missile for the U.S. homeland defense system and “active and passive” hypersonic defense programs.

The document only vaguely references the Pentagon’s concept of a “layered” homeland missile defense architecture, which has faced much skepticism from Congress and the Government Accountability Office. For the first time in three years, the Department of Defense requested no funding for this system in fiscal year 2023 and specified no plans for future funding, likely signaling the administration’s desire to end the effort.

The review acknowledges “the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive systems,” which stands as a notable statement for arms control. “Strengthening mutual transparency and predictability with regard to these systems could help reduce the risk of conflict,” according to the review. Future Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control likely will be impossible without Washington putting missile defense systems on the table for discussion, which it has long resisted. With this statement in the review, the Biden administration perhaps has hinted that it may contemplate some initial risk reduction measures with respect to U.S. missile defense systems.

The Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review focuses on China and Russia as the top U.S. adversaries.

Global Partnership States Commit to Biosecurity Actions


December 2022
By Kelsey Davenport

A group of states committed to take further action to mitigate the risk posed by biological threats during a meeting in October of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Global Partnership is a voluntary initiative formed in 2002 by what is now the Group of Seven industrialized nations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Comprised of 31 member states, the partnership funds and implements projects around the world to mitigate the risk of biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

Germany, the partnership’s current chair, prioritized addressing biological threats during its leadership of the initiative this year. (See ACT, July/August 2022.)

In a speech opening the partnership’s annual conference on Oct. 7, Susanne Baumann, state secretary at the German Federal Foreign Office, lauded the accomplishments of the partnership, calling it a “model for successful preventive security policy.” She said that the COVID-19 pandemic reminded the world “how devastating the emergence of a new pathogen can be for our societies” and “we need to re-examine our safeguards against the possible use of disease as a weapon.”

In their concluding declaration, states committed to “intensify our efforts to enhance both our national and global preparedness to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats,” including examining how scientific developments for fighting disease are a “potential risk for abuse to develop biological and toxin weapons.”

To address these threats, the states called on parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to make the treaty “fit for the challenges of the 21st century” and expressed support for creating an experts group to “identify concrete steps” to strengthen implementation of the convention. The states also endorsed creating at its next review conference a “systematic and structured mechanism for reviewing technical and scientific developments” that effect the BWC, such as the challenges posed by biotechnology, without impeding access to technology.

The statement also called out Russia, a former participant in the Global Partnership until its expulsion from the Group of Eight, for its “disinformation activities” that undermine the BWC and discredit “legitimate and peaceful international co-operation and assistance in the life sciences and biotechnology, including in the context of the Global Partnership.”

Although the statement did not provide specifics, Bauman in her remarks accused Russia of “leading a malicious disinformation campaign about alleged Western bioweapons in Ukraine, in the desperate and futile attempt to justify its war of aggression.”

The United States and the partnership have provided financial and technical assistance to Ukraine for biological security. In the Oct. 7 statement, the states said that the Global Partnership’s cooperative biosecurity activities have improved safety and security capacities.

States also committed to expand and intensify work on the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa, a Global Partnership project pursued in cooperation with the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. That initiative is aimed at strengthening capacities to “prevent, detect and respond to biological threats posed by high-consequence pathogens.”

 

Key states pledged stronger action to mitigate the risk posed by biological threats.

 

UN First Committee Calls for ASAT Test Ban


December 2022
By Heather Foye and Gabriela Rosa Hernández

A key UN panel formally adopted for the first time a resolution calling for countries to ban destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests.

Satellites like the Telstar 3-D communications satellite, deployed by the space shuttle Discovery in 1985, are among those space objects that could be better protected if anti-satellite weapons tests are banned. (Photo by NASA)Although not legally binding, the resolution reflects an increase in international political support for prohibiting ASAT weapons testing that destroy objects in space, which is formally referenced as “destructive direct-ascent anti-missile testing.”

The vote came during the 77th session of the UN General Assembly First Committee on disarmament and international security as it concluded weeks of negotiations that underscored geopolitical divisions between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states amid Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The ASAT testing resolution was adopted Nov. 1 by a 154–8 vote with 10 abstentions. It was championed by the United States, which is pursuing a related initiative that encourages states to undertake a voluntary moratorium on ASAT testing as a first step to curbing an arms race in space. (See ACT, November 2022.)

Last April, the United States became the first nation to commit to the self-imposed moratorium. Since then, Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have followed suit. (See ACT, May 2022.)

According to Reaching Critical Will, some states were displeased that the moratorium contained in the UN resolution was limited and did not restrict the proliferation of other space activities. In opposing the resolution, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, and Syria noted that the United States already had achieved ASAT missile capability and, hence, the resolution limited real progress toward preventing an arms race in outer space.

India and Pakistan, nuclear-armed states, were among those that abstained from voting on the resolution. Pakistan believed the draft resolution was “piecemeal,” according to Reaching Critical Will, and India is known to have conducted an ASAT weapons test.

In addition to India and the United States, China and Russia, as well as its predecessor, the Soviet Union, are the only states that have conducted ASAT weapons tests, which typically cause a large quantity of space debris when the missiles ram into orbiting satellites.

Most nations do not possess the technological capability to conduct such missile tests. The resolution builds on progress made last year when the First Committee voted to create an open-ended working group aimed at preventing an arms race in space. (See ACT, December 2021.)

The United States launched its ASAT testing ban initiative following a Russian test in November 2021 that destroyed a Russian satellite that had been in orbit since 1982. The collision caused at least 1,500 trackable pieces of debris to litter space. Astronauts on the International Space Station were advised to take shelter when the station encountered the debris. (See ACT, December 2021.)

Tensions among states at the First Committee also resurfaced over a resolution, introduced annually, on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The Oct. 6 resolution called on states to adopt the TPNW and commit not to participate in nuclear weapons activities. The treaty entered into force last year and now has 91 signatory states, 68 of whom have ratified it.

The nine states believed to possess nuclear weapons (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the United States) again voted against the resolution.

For the first time, Australia, which is under the U.S. nuclear security umbrella, abstained from voting on the resolution. In previous years dating back to 2018, Australia voted against the resolution. The previous Australian government, led by the Liberal Party, had opposed the TPNW. But the current Labor-led government, which came to power earlier this year, has been more open to embracing it. In June, Australia participated as an observer at the first meeting of TPNW state-parties held in Vienna. (See ACT, July/August 2022.)

Australia is “assessing its position on the TPNW, taking account of the need to ensure an effective verification and enforcement architecture, interaction of the [nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], and achieving universal support,” the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said in an Oct. 26 statement. It added that the government’s decision to observe the first meeting of TPNW states-parties in June “demonstrates the constructive engagement with the treaty.”

One month earlier, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong pointed to the “weak and desperate” nuclear rhetoric of Russian President Vladimir Putin for why Australia would “redouble” its efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. (See ACT, November 2022.)

Australia’s abstention on the TPNW resolution drew a U.S. warning on Nov. 8 when the U.S. Embassy in Canberra said the treaty “would not allow for U.S. extended deterrence relationships, which are still necessary for international peace and security,” The Guardian reported. Finland and Sweden, which applied for NATO membership this year, voted against the TPNW resolution for the first time. (See ACT, November 2022.) Since 2018, both countries have abstained on the resolution. They also attended the TPNW meeting of states-parties as observers.

A key UN panel adopted for the first time a resolution calling on countries to ban destructive anti-satellite missile tests.

WMD-Free Zone Conference Makes Little Progress


December 2022
By Gabriela Rosa Hernández

The chair of a UN conference on establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East expressed confidence that the initiative would bear fruit even though it has made little progress toward that goal.

The 25 states that attended a UN conference on establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East at the UN in New York in November made little progress, but the meeting chair expressed confidence that the initiative ultimately would bear fruit. (Photo by Kena Betancur/AFP via Getty Images)“We are fully aware that the journey to reach our objective is a very challenging one, but I am convinced that with a strong political will and commitment, we can achieve progress with collective dedication, wisdom and hard work,” Chair Jeanne Mrad of Lebanon said on Nov. 18, according to a UN statement.

The third annual session of the conference took place Nov. 14–18 in New York.

Participating states reaffirmed their commitment to produce a legally binding treaty to establish a zone without affecting the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear research for peaceful purposes. At least one state raised the idea of setting a timeline to draft a legal treaty.

Twenty-one states from the Middle East and four observer states—China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—participated in the session. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit also attended.

Several states said that progress on creating a zone was hindered by Israel’s continued absence. Neither Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons but is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), nor its main ally, the United States, has attended any of the three annual sessions.

“The NPT member states, especially nuclear-weapon states, must encourage all the invited states of the region to participate in this conference in an open and inclusive manner to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the establishment of the zone on the basis of consensus,” according to a Nov. 14 statement by the Lebanese mission to the UN.

Although the zone concept has generated broad international support over the years, there has been little practical progress toward the stated goal.

A future zone would commit parties not to possess, acquire, test, manufacture, or use any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their delivery systems, as provided for in the Middle East resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT review and extension conference.

Since 1995, debate over a potential zone has dominated and at times derailed discussions at NPT review conferences and in other disarmament forums. A UN study suggested that the region includes all League of Arab States, plus Iran and Israel.

In 2018 the UN General Assembly First Committee called on the UN secretary-general to convene a conference on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East in 2019 and every year thereafter until a zone is created. (See ACT, December 2018.)

Last year, the conference adopted a resolution by consensus that led to the creation of an informal working committee aimed at advancing the slow-going deliberations. (See ACT, January/February 2022.) The working committee is preparing a glossary of terminologies and general principles and obligations for the zone.

The fourth session of the conference will be held Nov. 13–17, 2023, in New York.

Participating states reaffirmed their commitment to produce a legally binding treaty to establish a zone.

Turkey Tests Short-Range Ballistic Missile


December 2022

Turkey carried out a short-range ballistic missile test over the Black Sea on Oct. 18, Bloomberg reported. The Tayfun, or Typhoon, missile was developed by the Turkish rocket and missile center Roketsan.

The Bora short-range ballistic missile, pictured, is among the many missiles in Turkey's arsenal. It is shorter than the Tayfun ballistic missile that was tested over the Black Sea on Oct. 18. (Photo: Roketsan)Experts said the test is evidence that Turkey is continuing to make progress with its indigenous missile program and will be less dependent on external suppliers such as the United States, but that does not mean the Tayfun will enter service soon.

The weapon was fired from a mobile launcher in Rize, flew 561 kilometers, and fell into the water off the coast by the port of Sinop. That distance is twice the range of the known ballistic missiles in the Turkish arsenal, Forbes reported on Oct. 20.

In 2017, Turkey unveiled the Bora short-range ballistic missile, which has a shorter range than the Tayfun and can hit targets up to 280 kilometers away. Turkey reportedly launched a Bora missile for the first time toward a Kurdistan Workers’ Party target in Iraq’s Kurdistan region in 2019 during Operation Claw. According to Forbes, the Bora missile complies with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), in which Turkey participates.

The MTCR, a voluntary grouping, aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks. The regime urges its members to curb their exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers.

The Tayfun missile is the first one that Turkey has tested that exceeds the MTCR distance limit. The weight of the missile payload is unknown. It is also unclear whether Turkey plans to export the missile.—GABRIELA ROSA HERNÁNDEZ

Turkey Tests Short-Range Ballistic Missile

Russia Loses Bid for UN Probe of Ukraine, United States


December 2022

After months of using international forums to accuse Ukraine and the United States of prohibited biological weapons activities, Russia failed to garner support on Nov. 2 for a UN Security Council resolution that would have established a formal commission to investigate its claims. (See ACT, September 2022.)

China and Russia were the sole supporters of the draft resolution, which invoked Article VI of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). France, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted against the resolution, and the remaining 10 council members abstained.

Article VI allows any member state to request that the Security Council investigate an alleged breach of the BWC, which provides no explanation of the modalities of such an investigation. Russia’s draft resolution marked the first time any nation has called on the council to organize a commission to investigate compliance concerns. The draft did not contain any insight into how the commission or the investigation would have operated.

The draft resolution came on the heels of a special session of the BWC, convened in September at Russia’s request, which ended inconclusively. (See ACT, October 2022.) Ukraine and the United States formally responded to each of Russia’s accusations during the week-long meeting, but in an Oct. 24 letter to the Security Council president, Russia claimed that the two accused nations did not provide the “necessary explanations” and that its questions about treaty compliance remain unanswered.

Following the vote, U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield discounted Russia’s pursuit of “answers” as disingenuous, stating that “We know this, because for nearly two decades, Russia participated in this very kind of cooperation with us, including on biological threats.”

It is likely that this issue will dominate discussion at the BWC review conference Nov. 28–Dec. 16 in Geneva.—LEANNE QUINN

Russia Loses Bid for UN Probe of Ukraine, United States

Explosive Weapons Declaration Endorsed


December 2022

More than 80 countries have endorsed a political declaration that aims to reduce the harm to civilians caused by attacking towns and cities with explosive weapons.

The text of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians From the Humanitarian Consequences Arising From the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas was finalized in Geneva in June under the leadership of Ireland and adopted at a ceremony in Dublin on Nov. 18.

Irish officials confirmed that 82 countries endorsed the declaration, including the United States and 23 other NATO members. The declaration recognizes the devastating harm to civilians from bombing and shelling in towns and cities and commits signatory states to take action to address harm to civilians. (See ACT, July/August and November 2022.)

Speaking on behalf of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Izumi Nakamitsu, UN high representative for disarmament affairs, said, “This political declaration marks a milestone in collective efforts to better protect civilians.” The secretary-general’s message also stated, “Parties to conflict and states must avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, and work to remove conflict from urban areas altogether.”—JEFF ABRAMSON

Explosive Weapons Declaration Endorsed

India Tests Submarine, Land Missiles


December 2022
By Heather Foye

India has tested successfully with “with high accuracy” a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from the INS Arihant, India’s first nuclear ballistic missile submarine, the Defence Ministry announced on Oct. 14. The test, which occurred in the Bay of Bengal, demonstrated “crew competency” and validated the nuclear submarine program, “a key element of India’s nuclear deterrence capability,” the ministry added.

In addition to testing a submarine-launched ballistic missile in October, news media reported that India tested its Agni-Prime (Agni-P) missile, shown here during an earlier test in 2021. (Photo by Indian Ministry of Defence)The exact missile type used in the test is unknown, but some experts believe it was the K-15 missile or the K-4 missile. The K-15 missile is estimated to have a range of 700 kilometers, which could reach parts of Pakistan, while the K-4 missile has an estimated range of 3,500 kilometers, which could reach China. (See ACT, March 2020.)

According to The Times of India, India is the sixth country to have nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. The five other countries are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Arihant (“Destroyer of Enemies”) was unveiled on July 26, 2009, under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. (See ACT, September 2009.)

In addition to the SLBM launch, India on Oct. 21 successfully tested its Agni-Prime (Agni-P) missile. The launch occurred at the test site on ABJ Abdul Kalam Island off the country’s eastern coast. The Hindustan Times reported on Oct. 21 that this was the third Agni-P test, following the first conducted in June 2021 and the second in December 2021. (See ACT, September and December 2021).

The Agni-P is “a nuclear-capable new-gen advanced variant of the Agni class of missiles” with a two-stage canister and a maximum range of 2,000 kilometers, the newspaper said. It added that the weapon weighs 50 percent less than India’s Agni-3 missile, has new guidance and propulsion systems, and because it is canistered, can be easily launched or transported from the road and stored for longer periods of time.

On Sept. 2, India unveiled its first home-grown aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, which can carry 30 aircraft and a crew of 1,600, Al Jazeera reported. Prime Minister Narendra Modi in remarks on the commissioning hailed an increasingly self-reliant India. “Vikrant is not just a warship. It is a testimony to the hard work, talent, influence, and commitment of 21st century India,” he said.

India’s advances were also highlighted by Army Gen. Anil Chauhan, chief of defense staff, who said during India’s annual Def-Expo 2022 event on Oct. 21 that “no country can aspire to emerge stronger without achieving self-reliance in defense, research and development, and manufacturing.”

The successful test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile from India’s first nuclear ballistic missile submarine achieved “high accuracy,” the Defence Ministry said.

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