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“The Arms Control Association and all of the staff I've worked with over the years … have this ability to speak truth to power in a wide variety of venues.”
– Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
June 2, 2022
Daryl Kimball

2023 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year Nominees Announced

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For Immediate Release: Dec. 8, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Tony Fleming, director for communications, (202) 463-8270 ext. 110

 

(Washington, D.C.)—Since 2007, the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association has nominated individuals and institutions that have, in the previous 12 months, advanced effective arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament solutions and raised awareness of the threats and the human impacts posed by mass casualty weapons.

"In a field that is often focused on grave threats and negative developments, our Arms Control Person(s) of the Year contest aims to highlight several positive initiatives—some at the grassroots level, some on the international scale—designed to advance disarmament, nuclear security, and international peace, security, and justice," noted Daryl G. Kimball, executive director.

"These nominees and their outstanding efforts during the past year illustrate how many different people can, in a variety of creative and sometimes courageous ways, contribute to a safer world for the generations of today and tomorrow," he added.

This year's nominees are listed below and a link to the ballot is available at ArmsControl.org/ACPOY.

Voting will take place between Dec. 8, 2023, and Jan. 11, 2024. The results will be announced Jan. 12, 2024. Follow the discussion on social media using the hashtag #ACPOY2023.

A full list of previous winners is available at ArmsControl.org/ACPOY/previous.

The 2023 nominees are:

  • Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan for his government's decision to host the May 2023 Summit of the G-7 Leaders in Hiroshima, which focused international attention on the growing risks of nuclear weapons and the special responsibilities of the leaders of nuclear-armed states and their allies to reduce nuclear risk and advance nuclear disarmament, and for Japan's $20 million contribution to a fund establishing Japan Chairs at overseas research institutions and think tanks focused on achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
  • Amb. Leonardo Bencini, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament and President of the ninth Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference for succeeding in establishing its first working group to “identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including possible legally-binding measures, and making recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention.”
  • Christopher Nolan, director and writer of the film biopic Oppenheimer, which introduced an entirely new generation to the complex history and unique horrors of nuclear weapons and reminded earlier generations that nuclear weapons and nuclear war still pose an existential threat to us all.
  • The leaders of several grassroots organizations—including Just Moms STL, the Navajo Uranium Radiation Victims Committee, and the Tularosa Basin Downwinders Consortium, among others—for successfully winning bipartisan support in the Senate to extend the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) and recognize the health claims of the downwinders of the first U.S. nuclear test in New Mexico and other affected communities in Arizona, Colorado, Guam, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah, and residents living near formerly utilized Cold War-era nuclear weapons production sites in Missouri.
  • IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) for monitoring the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant during wartime and reporting on the IAEA Director General's five principles for preventing a nuclear accident and ensuring the integrity of the power plant. Over the past year, nearly a dozen teams of IAEA experts have rotated into the war zone surrounding Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to keep the facility operating safely under the most difficult circumstances.
  • Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, head of the United Transitional Cabinet and leader of democratic forces of Belarus, for steadfast opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin's plan to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus as a dangerous escalation of nuclear brinkmanship and a violation of the country’s nuclear-free status, which was established by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Belarus of 1990, as well as the in the country’s 1994 constitution.
  • Workers and technicians at the U.S. Army’s Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky for successfully and safely completing the dangerous job of eliminating the last vestiges of the United States' once-enormous declared stockpile of lethal chemical munitions as required by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the supervision of U.S. Army's office of Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, the last mustard gas munition was destroyed in June at Pueblo; Blue Grass destroyed the last missile loaded with Sarin nerve agent in July. The elimination program cost an estimated $13.5 billion.
  • The governments of Bulgaria, Slovakia, South Africa, and Peru which will have by the end of 2023 all completed their yearslong processes to destroy their stockpiled cluster munitions as mandated by the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which 112 countries are party.
  • The governments of Austria and 27 co-sponsoring states for introducing and securing approval of resolution L.56 at the UN First Committee. It is the first-ever resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and it indicates growing support for progress toward a binding international legal instrument regulating LAWS. The resolution, which was approved by a vote of 164-5-8, calls for UN secretary-general António Guterres to seek the views of member states on “ways to address the related challenges and concerns they raise from humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical perspectives and on the role of humans in the use of force.” Guterres and ICRC president Mirjana Spoljaric issued a joint call urging world leaders to launch negotiations on a new legally binding instrument to set clear prohibitions and restrictions for LAWS and to conclude these negotiations by 2026.
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These nominees and their outstanding efforts during the past year illustrate how many different people can, in a variety of creative and sometimes courageous ways, contribute to a safer world for the generations of today and tomorrow.

40 Years After ‘The Day After’


December 2023
By Daryl G. Kimball

On Sunday, Nov. 20, 1983, I left my college dorm to visit my parents’ home in the suburbs of Oxford, Ohio. That evening, along with some 100 million other Americans, we witnessed two hours of stunning television that would mobilize the nation, as well as some of its leaders, to take meaningful steps to reduce the nuclear danger.

A scene from the 1983 film "The Day After." (United Archives GmbH / Alamy Stock Photo)“The Day After,” shown on the ABC television network, took viewers into the lives of characters in typical towns and cities in the midwestern United States, not far from U.S. nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos. Following a fictional NATO-Russia military confrontation that spun out of control, the film showed the shocking effects of an all-out nuclear exchange designed to hit “military and related-industrial targets” and the catastrophic aftermath.

The film remains a devastating reminder that nuclear deterrence is a strategy that can and will fail someday. It fueled criticism of the Reagan administration’s aggressive nuclear buildup and added momentum to the powerful public movement demanding that U.S. and Soviet leaders freeze and reverse the arms race. It spurred concerned citizens into action. It inspired me to help form a chapter of United Campuses Against Nuclear War at Miami University.

Four decades later, as a result of landmark bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements, Russian and U.S. Cold War nuclear stockpiles have been reduced drastically, but continue to pose an existential danger. Russia and the United States still cling to Cold War-era nuclear doctrines and deploy thousands of high-yield nuclear warheads on hundreds of ICBMs, designed to annihilate each other’s military and command capabilities within 30 minutes of a presidential launch order.

A new study by Princeton University researchers in Scientific American this month documents the effects of a nuclear attack from Russia on the 450 U.S. ICBM silos located in North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. These high-yield nuclear detonations would rain lethal fallout on several million people in the first hours, with tens of millions more people dying of radiation sickness thereafter—the same scenario as the 1983 film. Depending on weather patterns, more than 300 million people in the continental United States, the most populated areas of Canada, and northern Mexico would be at risk of lethal fallout.

The Pentagon’s official rationale for the U.S. ICBM arsenal is to force China or Russia to direct a large portion of their long-range nuclear forces at U.S. ICBMs to try to limit the damage that they would suffer from a U.S. nuclear counterstrike. Because the bulk of the U.S. ICBM force would be destroyed in a large-scale nuclear attack, it remains U.S. policy to keep the ICBMs on prompt alert to allow for “launch under attack.” This gives the president mere minutes to decide whether to authorize the use of ICBMs, which increases the risk that a false alarm or misinformation could trigger a nuclear catastrophe.

A large ICBM force hair-trigger alert is not only dangerous, but also pointless. The United States has more than 1,000 nuclear warheads on invulnerable strategic ballistic missile submarines at sea and long-range nuclear-armed bombers that can be airborne ahead of a surprise nuclear attack. Just one U.S. nuclear-armed submarine, carrying 160 thermonuclear warheads, each with an explosive yield of 100 kilotons TNT equivalent or more, could devastate a large country and kill tens of millions of people. The United States maintains eight strategic subs on continuous patrol. Furthermore, U.S. ICBMs, which likely are targeted against Russia’s land-based strategic rocket forces, would be hitting empty silos because Russia’s ICBM forces also would be launched on warning of a U.S. retaliatory attack if they were not already part of a Russian first strike.

Nevertheless, the United States has initiated a program to replace its existing Minuteman III missiles with 666 newly designed Sentinel ICBMs, 400 of which would be deployed through 2070 at a cost in excess of $150 billion. That assumes, incorrectly, that the United States needs to have 400 ICBMs for the indefinite future. Presidents can change outdated military requirements, and future arms reduction agreements certainly can reduce the number of ICBMs or, better yet, eliminate them altogether.

Amid the catastrophic destruction of “The Day After,” one character, a woman about to give birth, complains to her doctor, “We knew the score. We knew all about bombs. We knew about fallout. We knew this could happen for 40 years. But nobody was interested.”

We may not be so lucky to avoid nuclear Armageddon for another 40 years. Once again, our survival depends on more interest, more public engagement, and more pressure on policymakers to turn away from dangerous nuclear deterrence policies of the past. We must push leaders to reengage in disarmament negotiations to reduce the risks, the role, and the number of nuclear weapons, beginning with ICBMs.

 

On Sunday, Nov. 20, 1983, I left my college dorm to visit my parents’ home in the suburbs of Oxford, Ohio. That evening, along with some 100 million other Americans, we witnessed two hours of stunning television that would mobilize the nation, as well as some of its leaders, to take meaningful steps to reduce the nuclear danger.

NATO Allies Suspend Participation in CFE Treaty


December 2023
By Mohammedreza Giveh and Daryl G. Kimball

The United States and its NATO allies will suspend participation in the landmark Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, following Russia’s decision earlier this year to withdraw from the pact.

Ground troops from Bulgaria, Italy, and the United States take part in a NATO military exercise in May. Since then, the alliance announced plans to suspend participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, effective Dec. 7, following Russia’s decision to withdraw from the pact.  (Photo by Borislav Troshev/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)The North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s principal political decision-making body, announced the decision Nov. 7, stating that the allies “will suspend the operation of their obligations to the treaty” effective Dec. 7.

“We concluded that we should not continue to be bound by a treaty to which Russia is not bound,” the U.S. State Department said in a statement. “Suspension of CFE [Treaty] obligations will strengthen the [a]lliance’s deterrence and defense capacity by removing restrictions that impact planning, deployments, and exercises.”

In its announcement, the council said that, with this “decision fully supported by all NATO allies,” the alliance intends “to suspend the operation of the CFE Treaty for as long as necessary” as a consequence of Russia’s withdrawal.

The decision was described by U.S. officials as a “suspension of all legal obligations” under the treaty that allows individual states to comply with certain provisions, such as data exchanges, on a voluntary basis.

At some point, states that have suspended participation might resume full, legally binding participation. Since Nov. 7, several NATO states have issued national statements outlining the provisions that they will voluntarily continue to meet.

The treaty, often described as the cornerstone of European security, was signed in 1990 and put equal limits on the quantity of conventional weaponry deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It eliminated the Soviet Union’s quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe and more than 72,000 pieces of NATO and Soviet military equipment.

Polish army soldiers undergoing high-intensity training session at the Nowa Deba training ground in Poland in May. The exercises include collaboration with forces from Romania, Slovenia and the United States. (Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images)Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, and now the decision by NATO states to suspend participation in the accord puts the conventional arms control system in Europe, which was painstakingly built over decades, into near total collapse.

The United States withdrew from the 1990 Open Skies Treaty in 2020 over a compliance dispute, and Russia followed suit in 2021. (See ACT, July/August 2021.) This leaves the Vienna Document, a confidence-building mechanism by which participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe agree to inspections and data exchanges to increase the transparency of their conventional forces, as the only remaining piece of the post-Cold War conventional arms control security architecture. U.S. officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Arms Control Today that the United States intends fully to participate in and comply with the terms of the Vienna Document.

The dispute between Russia and NATO over the CFE Treaty dates back nearly a quarter century. After the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO in the 1990s, efforts were made to revise the agreement to replace the bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits with a system of national and territorial ceilings reflecting the new geopolitical reality.

During the 1999 treaty summit in Istanbul, treaty members signed an agreement known as the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty to update the CFE Treaty structure. Russia also pledged to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia and to show restraint in its deployment near the Baltics. (See ACT, November 1999.)

But the United States and its allies did not ratify the adapted treaty, citing the ongoing deployment of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia. Russia disagreed and complained that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia were not subject to CFE Treaty limits. Moscow also wanted constraints eliminated on how many forces it could deploy on its southern and northern flanks. (See ACT, January/February 2008.)

In 2007, Moscow declared its “suspension” of the original treaty in reaction to the ongoing delay of the adapted treaty’s entry into force, thereby halting Russian implementation of treaty-related transparency commitments and conventional force ceilings.

In May 2023, Russia announced that it would withdraw formally from the pact in objection to NATO countries “fueling the Ukraine conflict” and embracing Finland and Sweden as new alliance members. (See ACT, June 2023.) The withdrawal will not have any impact on Russia’s military posture.

At a briefing on Nov. 8 for nongovernmental experts, U.S. officials reaffirmed public statements that the United States and its NATO allies remain committed to effective conventional arms control as a critical element of Euro-Atlantic security.

The officials also said that the allies will continue to pursue measures with responsible partners that aim to bolster stability and security in Europe by reducing risk, preventing misperceptions, avoiding conflicts, and building trust. They did not elaborate on specific measures that would be pursued.

The United States and its NATO allies announced their plans following Russia’s decision earlier this year to withdraw from the pact.

Our Creative, Effective, and Productive Team

Inside the Arms Control Association November 2023 More than a decade ago, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation recognized ACA as an “exceptional organization that effectively addresses pressing national and international challenges with an impact disproportionate to its small size.” We’re still modest in size and resources, but our dedicated professional staff and high-caliber board members continue to work hard to make a difference. This month has been no exception. In the wake of Russia’s counterproductive decision to withdraw its ratification from the CTBT, we continue to lead...

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